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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
NORM SMITH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 990236-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for using a concealed weapon in the commission 
of a crime of violence, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501, 
504(3) (1995), and two counts of aggravated assault, both third degree felonies, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995).1 This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was defendant denied his Sixth Amendment right to call witnesses on his behalf 
and to confront the witnesses against him? 
defendant has not challenged on appeal his conviction for interfering with a 
lawful arrest, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1995). 
See Aplt. Brf. 
1 
Standard of Review. When reviewing a trial court decision to not allow a defendant 
to call a witness or to limit the cross-examination of a witness, the appellate court "review[s] 
the legal rule applied for correctness and the application of the rule to the facts for an abuse 
of discretion." See State v. Chavez, 2002 UT App 9, f 17, 41 P.3d 1137 (reviewing a trial 
court's limit on cross-examination); see also State v. Byrns, 911 P.2d 981, 987 (Utah App. 
1995) (reviewing for an abuse of discretion the trial court's finding that defendant had not 
demonstrated that a witness was material to the case under the Sixth Amendment). 
2. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for carrying a 
concealed weapon in the commission of a crime of violence? 
Standard of Review. The court affords great deference to the jury verdict and will not 
reverse a conviction unless "the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that reasonable 
[minds] could not possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. 
Lamm, 606 P.2d 229,231 (Utah 1980). 
3. Did the trial court properly refuse to merge the aggravated assault charges with 
the concealed weapons charge? 
Standard of Review. Whether the aggravated assault convictions should merge with 
the concealed weapons conviction is a legal question reviewed for correctness. See State v. 
Bluff, 2002 UT 66, f 37, — Utah Adv. Rep —. 
4. Was defense counsel ineffective for not requesting an instruction on threatening 
with a dangerous weapon as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault and was it plain 
error for the trial court not to give such an instruction sua sponte? 
2 
Standard of Review—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel When a defendant is 
represented by new counsel on appeal and the record is otherwise adequate to review a 
defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court will review those claims 
as a matter of law. See State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998); State v. Vessey, 967 
P.2d 960, 964 (Utah App. 1998). In evaluating an ineffectiveness claim, the Court 
"'indulgefs] in the strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance.'" State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) 
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct 2052,2065 (1984)). 
Standard of Review—Plain Error. Where a defendant raises an issue for the first time 
on appeal, this Court will not reverse a conviction based on that claim unless the defendant 
demonstrates plain error or exceptional circumstances. See Bluff, 2002 UT 66, at J 25 see 
also Utah R. Evid. 103(d). However, this Court will not save the defendant from any alleged 
error if defendant made a conscious decision not to seek the relief or otherwise led the trial 
court into error. See Bluff, 2002 UT App 66, at f 25. 
5. Was defendant denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel when his counsel did not move for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case 
on the ground that the State introduced no evidence that defendant did not have a concealed 
weapons permit? 
Standard of Review. See standard of review for ineffective assistance under issue 4 
above. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are relevant to a 
determination of this case and are reproduced in relevant part in Addendum A: U.S. Const, 
amend. VI; Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1995); Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (Supp. 1995); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506 (1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Defendant was charged with using a concealed weapon during the commission of a 
crime of violence, two counts of aggravated assault, and interfering with a peace officer 
making a lawful arrest. R. 1-2. He was bound over for trial on all four counts at a 
preliminary hearing. R. 16-17, 20-21, 26-27. Although he was represented by court-
appointed counsel,2 defendant filed a plethora of pro se motions over the course of the next 
two and one-half years, most of which were denied. See generally R. 12-67%? Defendant's 
2Defendant had at least five different court-appointed attorneys. His original 
attorney, Douglas T. Terry, withdrew after defendant filed a bar complaint against him, R. 
51, 54; Tom Blakely withdrew because he had previously been approached professionally 
by an individual involved in a property dispute with defendant, R. 61-62; Lamar J. 
Winward withdrew for unspecified reasons, but with defendant's express concurrence, R. 
121-25; O'Dean Bowler withdrew after defendant sued him in federal court, R. 368-70, 
373-75; and Kenneth L. Combs served as counsel through the trial, R. 422-23, 931-35. 
3Pro se motions filed by defendant included, but were not limited to, motions 
asking the court to declare whether it was proceeding under common law, equity law, or 
maritime law, R. 12-13, 322-24,493-99; an objection to the assignment of a magistrate 
for the preliminary hearing, R. 15; a motion to dismiss the case for an alleged illegal ex 
parte communication between the trial judge and defendant's counsel, R. 355-58; motions 
seeking the recusal of Judge G. Rand Beacham for alleged bias, R. 349, 391, 653; a 
motion to quash the affidavit of probable cause, R. 598-601; motions to dismiss based on 
disputed evidence, R. 185-86, 251-52, 318-19, 446-48, 512-16; motions to dismiss and 
4 
counsel also filed a motion to suppress evidence and to dismiss the case. R. 328-39. Those 
motions were denied. See R. 589, 615-22. 
Following a five-day trial, a jury convicted defendant of all four counts as charged. 
R. 724-25; R. 933: 1156-57. Thereafter, defendant, through counsel, moved for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. R. 727-30. Defendant subsequently filed, pro se, an amended 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for new trial. R. 745-47,751-
73. Those motions were denied. R. 779-80. Following a 70-day diagnostic evaluation, R. 
784-87, defendant was sentenced to one-to-fifteen years in prison for carrying a concealed 
weapon, zero-to-five years in prison for each aggravated assault conviction, and six months 
in jail for interfering with a lawful arrest. R. 829-31. The court suspended the sentence and 
placed defendant on supervised probation for 36 months, subject to a jail commitment of 60 
days, the payment of a $2,000 fine, and various other conditions. R. 831-33. Defendant 
timely appealed. R. 835-36. The trial court has since terminated his supervised probation. 
R. 920 (located in manila envelope marked "Supp. Index & Pleading") 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
Prelude 
On the morning of April 9,1996, defendant and his friend Clayton Call drove their 
motorcycles to a piece of property in Virgin, Utah to feed defendant's horses that were being 
suppress based on various other theories, R. 133-35, 162-64, 292-94, 297-302, 305-06, 
309-10, 313-15, 361-63,449-72, 483-92, 500-11, 517-20, 571-80; and motions for the 
appointment of an investigator, R. 30 (granted, R. 39-41), a legal researcher, R. 344-46, 
537-39; a fingerprint expert, R. 270-71, 435-36 (granted, R. 613-14, 623), and an expert 
on police procedures and weapons, R. 586-87. 
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kept at the property. R. 933: 872; R. 931: 713. Defendant claimed that upon his arrival he 
discovered that his personal property there had been vandalized and that some of it was 
missing. R. 933: 872; R. 931: 714. Suspecting involvement by members of a family with 
whom defendant had been feuding over the property, defendant and his friend left to look for 
his missing property at Coal Pits Mountain. R. 933: 872-73; R. 931: 715. When Call's 
motorcycle broke down, defendant rode his motorcycle to the inn, owned by Call's mother 
and where defendant and his family were residing, to retrieve Call's automobile. R. 933: 
872-73,956-57; R. 931: 715-16. Before leaving the inn to pick up Call, defendant retrieved 
his pistol and placed it in a holster on his waist. R. 933: 874, 881. After defendant picked 
up Call, the two drove to a local bar where defendant telephoned his wife, directing her to 
report the incident to police. R. 933: 874; R. 931: 717-18. The two then returned to the 
property in Virgin between noon and 1:00. R. 933: 873; R. 931: 717-18, 781-82. 
Defendant and Call stood guard at the property for the next several hours. R. 933: 
963. During that time, defendant and Call retrieved several items from an underground 
cellar, including two rifles and boxes of ammunition which they placed in a partially-
constructed building. R. 931: 783-84. After a few hours, defendant drove to a local bar to 
verify that his wife had called police. R. 933: 877; R. 931: 720. When he returned, he spoke 
to a couple of neighbors, including Ron Felton. R. 933: 1068. During the conversation, 
defendant declared that 'the only good cop is a dead cop." R. 933:1068. Some time before 
4:00, defendant began pacing up and down the property and throwing dirt clods at Felton's 
home, prompting Felton's wife Sharon to call 9-1-1. R. 933: 1065. 
6 
The Standoff and Aggravated Assault. 
Near 4:00 that afternoon, Call left in his car. R. 933: 959-60. However, when he saw 
that deputies from the sheriffs office were on their way up to the property, Call returned and 
notified defendant of their impending arrival. R. 933:959-60; R. 931: 722-24. At about that 
time, Mrs. Felton observed defendant pull his shirt up and over his gun. R. 933: 1066-69. 
Shortly thereafter, Deputies Johnny Owen and Lorin Orvin from the Washington County 
Sheriffs Office pulled up to the property in their cars. R. 935: 271-75,332, 500-02. After 
the two deputies exited their vehicles, Deputy Owen advised defendant that they had received 
a complaint he was brandishing a weapon. R. 935: 279. When Deputy Owen asked 
defendant if he had a weapon, defendant lifted up his shirt to expose his pistol and placed his 
hand on the butt of the gun. R. 935: 281-82, 323; R. 931: 520-21. Deputy Owen asked 
defendant to surrender the gun, but defendant refused, indicating that he was always arrested 
by police when they responded to a complaint. R. 935: 282-84, 323; R. 931: 524. 
Deputy Call slowly moved toward defendant, repeatedly asking him to surrender the 
gun, but defendant backed away. R. 935: 283; R. 931: 522-25. Meanwhile, Deputy Orvin 
removed his gun from its holster and held it so that it was concealed from view. R. 931: 522-
23. During the exchange, defendant was upset and agitated, which agitation gradually 
increased during the encounter. R. 935:284. After a few moments and without provocation, 
defendant turned and ran to the partially-constructed building, entering through an open 
window frame. R. 935: 285-86, 305; R. 931: 525. The deputies pursued him, positioning 
themselves just outside two separate windows. R. 935: 305, 308, 312; R. 931: 526-27. 
7 
In the building, defendant attempted to hide the rifles in the building and concealed 
himself behind several garbage bins and other miscellaneous debris in the room. R. 935: 
309,318-19; R. 931: 527;R.933: 892. The deputies tried to persuade defendant to surrender 
his weapon. R. 935: 309,312; R. 931: 531. When defendant responded that he could shoot 
the officers, Deputy Orvin told defendant that although he may very well shoot one of them, 
the other would shoot him before defendant could shoot them both. R. 935: 309, 323; R. 
931:544. Defendant then dropped to his knees and pointed his gun directly at Deputy Orvin. 
R. 935: 310-11; R. 931: 531. Deputy Orvin immediately dove for cover under the window 
and radioed for additional assistance. At that point, Deputy Owen drew his weapon on 
defendant, who crouched further behind the garbage cans. R. 935: 310-11. 
Defendant surrendered after several minutes of negotiation, putting the gun down on 
one of the garbage cans in front of him. R. 935: 313-14; R. 931: 532-33. R. 935: 314; R. 
931: 533. After arresting defendant, Deputy Owen returned to the building where he 
retrieved defendant's pistol and the two other guns in the building, as well as the boxes of 
ammunition. R. 935: 315,320-22; R. 931: 533. Defendant was thereafter transported to the 
jail in St. George for booking. R. 931: 545. After the booking process was complete, 
defendant acknowledged to Deputy Orvin that they could have shot him and thanked him for 
not doing so. R. 931: 545. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Sixth Amendment Right to Call and Confront Witnesses, Defendant 
contends that his Sixth Amendment right to call witnesses in his favor was violated when the 
trial court did not permit him to call Ron Felton to rebut the testimony of Sharon Felton. 
However, defendant did not ask to call Ron Felton to discredit Sharon Felton's testimony, 
but to testify regarding defendant's emotional state 30-40 minutes before deputies arrived. 
The trial court properly denied that request as irrelevant- Indeed, Sharon Felton had not yet 
testified when defendant sought Ron Felton's testimony. Because defendant did not ask that 
he be allowed to call Ron Felton to rebut Sharon Felton's testimony, his Sixth Amendment 
claim fails. 
Defendant also contends that his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses 
against him was violated when the trial court imposed a time limit on his cross-examination 
of Deputy Orvin. Reasonable time limits on cross-examination do not offend the Sixth 
Amendment. Where, as here, the defendant has had a reasonable opportunity to pursue the 
matters on direct and otherwise impeach the witness, his confrontation rights are not violated. 
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence. Defendant claims that the evidence was 
insufficient to demonstrate that he intentionally concealed his weapon. Defendant's 
argument fails for several reasons. First, because the concealed weapons statute does not 
specify a mental state, the State was only required to show intent, knowledge, or 
recklessness. Second, defendant ignores the evidence that supports a finding of intentional 
9 
conduct. For example, Sharon Felton testified that although defendant usually wears his shirt 
tucked in, he pulled it up and over his gun just prior to the deputies' arrival. 
Defendant also argues, for the first time on appeal, that the statute requires that the 
concealed weapon be concealed during the commission of the crime. However, any error 
here, if any, cannot constitute plain error inasmuch as no appellate decision has interpreted 
the statute's requirement. In any event, the statute is reasonably read to only require that 
incident to a crime of violence the weapon is later exposed and used during the commission 
of the crime. 
III. Merger, Defendant argues that the aggravated assault convictions should merge 
with the conviction for the offense of using a concealed weapon during the commission of 
a crime. However, applying the analysis set forth in State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234 (Utah 
1990), this claim fails. The second degree felony offense is an enhancement statute, different 
in nature than other criminal statutes. Moreover, a review of the statute and its purpose 
reveals that the legislature did not intend that aggravated assault and the other aggravating 
offenses merge with the concealed weapons conviction. To find otherwise would not only 
require the merger of aggravated assault, but also the merger of the greater offenses of rape, 
murder, and aggravated murder. Such a result stands against logic and reason and is contrary 
to the statute's deterrent purpose. 
IV. Lesser Included Instruction. Defendant complains that the trial court did not 
give an instruction on threatening with a dangerous weapon, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506 
(1995), as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault. He argues that his counsel was 
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constitutionally deficient in not requesting the instruction and that the trial court's failure to 
give the instruction sua sponte was plain error. Under either theory, however, defendant's 
claim fails because a decision not to request such an instruction might properly be considered 
sound trial strategy. A defendant might rather risk a conviction for the greater offense, than 
risk giving the jury yet another theory upon which to convict him. 
V. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, Defendant argues that his counsel was 
ineffective for not moving for a directed verdict based on the State's failure to introduce 
evidence that defendant did not have a concealed weapons permit. However, because a 
motion for a directed verdict would inevitably have been followed by a motion to reopen the 
case, defendant can show no prejudice. Defendant admitted on cross-examination that he did 
not have a concealed weapons permit and implicitly admitted that fact throughout the 
proceedings. Accordingly, the State would have had little difficulty introducing evidence 
that defendant had no permit once the case was reopened. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO 
CALL WITNESSES ON HIS BEHALF AND TO CONFRONT THE 
WITNESSES AGAINST HIM 
In his first point on appeal, defendant lodges two complaints based on the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. First, he complains that he was denied his 
Sixth Amendment right to call witnesses on his behalf when the trial court refused to permit 
him to call Ron Felton as a witness to discredit the testimony of his wife Sharon Felton. 
Aplt. Brf. at 17-19. Second, defendant complains that he was denied his Sixth Amendment 
right to confront the witnesses against him when the trial court imposed a time limitation on 
his cross-examination of Deputy Lorin Orvin. Aplt. Brf. at 19-23. Both claims fail. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT 
TO CALL WITNESSES IN HIS FAVOR. 
Defendant "asserts that he was denied [his Sixth Amendment] right to call Ron Felton 
in his behalf to contradict Sharon Felton's testimony." Aplt. Brf. at 19. Because defendant 
never asked to call Ron Felton to contradict Sharon Felton's testimony, his claim fails. 
After defendant rested, the State called Sharon Felton to rebut the testimony of 
defendant. See R. 933:1061-70. During the State's case in chief, Deputies Owen and Orvin 
had testified that while defendant was barricaded in the building, he told the deputies that he 
could shoot them, R. 935:309, or that "all you son-of-a-bitches should be dead," R. 931:530. 
When defendant took the stand in his own defense, he denied making the remarks, explaining 
that his "father-in-law is a police officer and another gentleman that [he] dearly care[s] about 
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is a police officer and [he] do[es] not harbor those feelings." R. 933: 912-13. To rebut that 
claim, the State called Mrs. Felton. R. 933: 1061-70. She testified that in a conversation 
with her husband and another neighbor some 30 to 40 minutes before the deputies arrival, 
defendant remarked that the "only good cop is a dead cop." R. 933: 1068. 
Although defendant later asked that he be allowed to recall Clayton Call to rebut Mrs. 
Felton's testimony, he did not ask that he be allowed to call Ron Felton to rebut that 
testimony as now claimed. See R. 933: 1106-09. Having failed to seek the rebuttal 
testimony at trial, he cannot now complain on appeal that the trial court erred in refusing to 
permit the witness to testify. See State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 783-84 (Utah 1992) 
(observing that defendant must "raise claims at the appropriate time at the trial level, so the 
trial judge has an opportunity to rule on the issue"); State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48,53 (Utah 1981) 
(holding that "an appellate court will not rule on grounds not addressed in the trial court"). 
Defendant correctly notes that earlier at trial, after the State rested its case, he asked 
that he be allowed to call Ron Felton as a witness in his case. See R. 931: 673. However, 
contrary to defendant's claim on appeal, he did not seek to call Mr. Felton to rebut Mrs. 
Felton's testimony—the State had not even called her as a witness at that point. See R. 935: 
271-509; R. 931: 518-624. Rather, he wished to call Mr. Felton to rebut testimony from 
Deputy Owen that defendant was agitated during his later encounter with the deputies on 
Mrs. Felton's 9-1-1 call. R. 931: 673; see also 935: 284. The court, however, denied 
defendant's request to call Mr. Felton. R. 931: 674. Where Mr. Felton was not present 
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during defendant's encounter with the deputies, the court concluded that Mr. Felton's 
testimony would be "too attenuated" from the incident itself. R. 931: 674. 
Defendant complains that Sharon Felton was eventually called by the State as a 
rebuttal witness and testified to that very issue. Aplt. Brf. at 19; see R. 933:1068 (testifying 
that defendant "was very agitated. He was walking up and down the, the property with a 
gun."). By this time, however, defendant had taken the witness stand and testified that 
although he was "irritated" upon discovering that his property had been vandalized, any 
anger or irritation had dissipated earlier that day and he was "totally calm" by the time the 
deputies arrived. R. 933: 965-67, 979. Although the trial court had earlier ruled that 
evidence of defendant's emotional state earlier that day was not relevant, defendant later 
opened the door for the State to impeach his credibility and to rebut his evidence after 
defendant testified to his earlier emotional state. Cf. State v. Squire, 888 P.2d 1102,1103-04 
(Utah App. 1994) (holding that because defendant denied being a drug dealer and user, he 
opened the door for the State to introduce evidence of a prior conviction). 
Moreover, the trial court acted well within its discretion in denying testimony about 
defendant's emotional state before the deputies' arrival. Although the Compulsory Process 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment grants a defendant the right to call witnesses in his favor, 
see Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44,52,107 S.Ct. 2704,2709 (1987),4 that right is subject to 
4The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." 
U.S. Const., amend. VI. This right is guaranteed in State criminal prosecutions by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Rock, 483 U.S. at 52, 107 S.Ct. at 2709 (citing Washington, 388 
U.S. at 17-19, 87 S.Ct. at 1922-1923). 
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reasonable restrictions, see United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 
1264 (1998). A violation of the Compulsory Process Clause does not occur unless "the 
defendant was arbitrarily deprived of 'testimony [that] would have been relevant and 
material,... and vital to the defense.'" United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 
867, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3446 (1982) (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 16, 87 S.Ct. 
1920,1922 (1967)) (brackets and emphasis in original); accord State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 
264, 274 (Utah 1985); State v. Byrns, 911 P.2d 981, 987 (Utah App. 1995). 
In this case, the proposed testimony was neither relevant nor material. The State did 
not seek to demonstrate that defendant was agitated at any time prior to the deputies' arrival. 
See R. 931: 674. Nor did the State claim that defendant held a grudge against the deputies. 
Accordingly, whether defendant was agitated 40 minutes before their arrival has no bearing 
on whether he later threatened the deputies with his weapon. Moreover, defendant's own 
witness, Clayton Call, testified that defendant was angry and agitated. R. 931: 768, 774. 
And although defendant testified that he was totally calm by the time the deputies arrived, 
he acknowledged that he was "irritated" with the sheriffs office and its deputies "because 
[he] expected them to respond to [his] complaints [made earlier that day and on other 
occasions] and they hadn't come." R. 933: 964-65. In light of defendant's own testimony 
and that of Mr. Call, Mr. Felton's testimony was not material. That is, there is no 
"reasonable probability that its presence would affect the outcome of trial." Schreuder, 712 
P.2d at 275. Defendant's claim must therefore fail. 
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B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT 
TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM. 
Defendant also contends that his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses 
against him was violated. He generally argues that the trial court's time limitation on his 
cross-examination of Deputy Orvin violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the 
witness. See Aplt. Brf. at 23. This contention also fails. 
1- The Sixth Amendment Right to Confrontation. 
The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const, amend. VI. 
The Confrontation Clause does not simply ensure the right of the accused to physically face 
those who testify against him, but it 6"secure[s] for the [accused] the opportunity of cross-
examination.'" Davisv.Alaska,4l5U.S.30S,3l5-3l6,94S.Ct 1105,1110 (1974) (quoting 
5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1395, p. 123 (3d ed. 1940)) (emphasis omitted). However, like 
the Sixth Amendment right to call witnesses, the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation "is 
not an absolute right." State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474,479 (Utah 1990). 
The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation only "guarantees an opportunity for 
effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to 
whatever extent, the defense might wish." Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15,20,106 S.Ct. 
292,295 (1985) {per curiam) (emphasis in original). Thus, "trial judges retain wide latitude 
insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on cross-
examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally 
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relevant." Delawarev. VanArsdall,475U.S.673,679,106S.Ct. 1431,1435(1986);accord 
State v. Chavez, 2002 UT App 9, f 19, 41 P.3d 1137. 
To prevail on a confrontation claim, the defendant must "show[ ] that he was 
prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a 
prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby '[ ] expose to the jury the 
facts from which jurors. . . could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of 
the witness.'" Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680, 106 S.Ct. at 1436 (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 
318, 94 S.Ct. at 1111); accord Chavez, 2002 UT App 9, at \ 18. The Seventh Circuit has 
articulated the inquiry on appeal as follows: The reviewing court must determine "whether 
the restrictions that the [trial] court imposed on the defendant's cross-examination deprived 
the defense of a meaningful opportunity to elicit available, relevant information that was 
likely to impeach the credibility of the witness." United States v. Cameron, 814 F.2d 403, 
406 (7th Cir. 1987). In other words, "[a] restriction imposed on cross-examination 'does not 
violate the Confrontation Clause unless it limits relevant testimony and prejudices the 
defendant.'" United States v. Marbella, 73 F.3d 1508,1513 (9th Cir.) (quoting United States 
v. Shabani, 48 F.3d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1995)), cert, denied, 518 U.S. 1020,116 S.Ct. 2555 
(1996). 
Although Utah courts have not addressed the propriety of imposing time limits on 
cross-examination, other jurisdictions have concluded that reasonable time limits do not 
offend the Sixth Amendment. Seef e.g., United States v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270,1279 (9th 
Cir. 1997); United States v. Vest, 116F.3d 1179, 1186-88 (7th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 522 
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U.S. 1119, 118 S.Ct. 1058 (199S); Marbella, 73 F.3d 1513 (9th Cir. 1996); People v. Ducu, 
226 Cal.App.3d 1412, 1415, 277 Cal.Rptr. 464, 466 (Cal. App. 1991); Heald v. State, 492 
N.E.2d 671,678 (Ind. 1986). The Seventh Circuit observed that the trial court should always 
ensure that the defendant has had a "reasonable chance" to pursue the matters raised on direct 
and to otherwise impeach the witness. See Vest, 116 F.3d at 1186. Thus, any time limits 
imposed by the court should be treated "as guideposts rather than deadlines." Id. at 1187. 
Whether a time limit is reasonable depends on the particulars of each case, including the 
amount of time taken on direct, the complexity of issues involved, the productivity of cross-
examination during the time given, the utility of further cross-examination, and even such 
"imponderables as the judge's assessment of the jury's comprehension and attention span." 
See id.5 In other words, the trial court "must exercise judgment in deciding when the point 
of diminishing returns has been reached, or passed " Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
2. Defendant Had Ample Opportunity to Cross-examine Deputy Orvin. 
Defendant here has not demonstrated that the time limit imposed by the trial court was 
unreasonable or that it otherwise deprived him of an opportunity to conduct effective cross-
examination. He does not identify what relevant matters he was precluded from exploring 
as a result of the time limitation, much less describe how he was prejudiced thereby. See 
5See also Ducu, 226 Cal.App.3d at 1415,277 Cal.Rptr. at 466 (noting that trial 
court gave defense "at least as much time to conduct his cross-examination as he gave to 
the district attorney for direct"); Marbella, 73 F.3d at 1513 (noting that cross-examination 
had already undermined the witnesses' recollection of events and that additional 
questioning would be unproductive); United States v. Malik, 928 F.2d 17, 20-21 (1st Cir. 
1991) (observing that the relevancy of the proposed additional cross-examination was not 
clear at the time of trial and its impeachment value was small in any event). 
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Marbella, 73 F.3d at 1513. His claim must therefore fail as nothing but a bald assertion. See 
State v. Parra, 972 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah App. 1998) (recognizing the well-established 
principle that "a reviewing court will not address arguments that are not adequately briefed"). 
A review on the merits also reveals that the trial court's time limit was reasonable. 
Length of Direct Examination. The prosecutor questioned Deputy Orvin on direct for 
approximately 34 minutes over the course of two days. R. 688 (count 4:26 - 4:41); R. 682 
(count 8:49 - 9:08). Defendant then cross-examined Deputy Orvin for approximately 50 
minutes before the trial court ordered a recess. See R. 682-83 (9:25 - 10:15); R. 931: 583.6 
During the recess, the court advised defendant that he would be permitted to cross-examine 
Deputy Orvin for an additional 30 minutes. R. 931: 583. The time allotted for cross-
examination of Deputy Orvin was thus more than twice that used for direct examination. 
Complexity of Issues. The 80-minute time period for cross-examination of Deputy 
Orvin gave defendant more than enough time "to elicit available, relevant information" 
designed to impeach the officer's credibility. Cameron, 814 F.2d at 406, The issues at trial 
were neither complex nor difficult to develop or present. Deputy Orvin was not required to 
explain complex procedures or provide special expertise. Like Deputy Owen, he simply 
recounted the events that transpired in the late afternoon of April 9,1996. The jury was thus 
faced with the straightforward task of determining whether or not to believe the deputy's 
account of the incident. 
6The trial court remarked that defendant had questioned Deputy Orvin for the same 
amount of time as did the prosecutor, but included in that calculus the 17-minute 
discussion outside the presence of the jury on the admissibility of defendant's statement 
at the jail. See R. 931: 583; see also R. 682 (9:08-9:22); R. 931: 535-43. 
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Productivity of Cross-examination and Utility of Further Questioning. Although 
defendant explored some relevant issues during cross-examination, he spent needless time 
on issues that at best were only marginally relevant. The day before, defendant's cross-
examination of Deputy Owen was dominated by questions of little to no relevance and 
persisted three times as long as the State's direct examination of him. See generally R. 935: 
324-498; compare R. 687 (53 minutes: 10:09-10:31; 10:51-11:22), with R. 687-88 (162 
minutes: 11:22-11:40; 12:04-12:22; 1:39-3:00; 3:30-4:15). To avoid a similar outcome, the 
court ordered a brief recess after 50 minutes of cross-examination of Deputy Orvin and 
instructed defendant that he would be limited to 30 more minutes of cross-examination. The 
court, however, indicated that additional time would nevertheless be permitted if defendant 
demonstrated that he had used the 30 minutes for relevant questioning and additional time 
was necessary to flesh out other significant matters. R. 931: 585. 
During the first 50 minutes of cross-examination, defendant had explored a few 
relevant issues—e.g., the visibility of defendant's gun, the timing and circumstances of the 
assault, and a possible motive to frame defendant. See R. 931: 546-57, 576-83. However, 
he spent undue time probing into minutiae as he did the day before with Deputy Owen—e.g., 
asking for detailed explanations about the deputies' arrival on the scene, the layout of the 
property, the positions of the cars, the characteristics of the fence, and the types of animals 
on the property. R. 931: 558-75. During the next 30 minutes, he also explored a few 
relevant issues, including the details of defendant's retreat to the building, the brief standoff, 
and defendant's surrender, R. 931: 589,592-97,604-05,610. He also elicited testimony that 
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Deputy Orvin's primary focus was on Clayton Call and Deputy Owen rather than defendant, 
R. 931: 586. However, notwithstanding the court's warning to use his time wisely, he used 
nearly half of the 30 minutes exploring matters of little to no relevance. For example, he 
asked Deputy Orvin to identify the color of defendant's holster and the color of the clothing 
worn by defendant and Call. R. 931: 587-88, 597-98. He quizzed Deputy Orvin on such 
picayune details as how close the deputy was to the building, R. 931: 604, the manner in 
which the deputy ducked down for cover when defendant pointed the gun at him, R. 931: 
605-07, and the nature and relative positioning of the debris in the room where defendant was 
barricaded, R. 931: 598, 601-03, 611-12. He spent additional time revisiting the positions 
of the cars and the distances between those involved and the cars. R. 931: 589-92. 
Moreover, in an impermissible attempt to challenge the deputies' authority to be on the 
property, defendant elicited testimony from Deputy Orvin that defendant had ordered the 
deputies off the property as trespassers because they had no warrant. See R. 931: 607-09. 
Time Limit Extended. After 30 minutes of cross-examination, the court told defendant 
that he had reached his time limit. R. 931: 613. However, the court did not insist on strict 
adherence to the time limit, but permitted defendant to ask additional questions concerning 
the details of his surrender. R. 931: 613-14. Only after it became evident that additional 
time would not result in relevant questioning did the trial court terminate cross-examination. 
As in Vest, the court's "decision to end cross-examination only after concluding that 
[defendant] was wasting time with repetitive [and irrelevant] questions shows the necessary 
particularized judgment necessary for limiting cross-examination." 116 F.3d at 1187. 
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In summary, because defendant covered the issues raised on direct, spending more 
than twice the amount of time on cross-examination as the prosecutor used on direct, and 
given the simplicity of the issues and defendant's insistence to focus on matters of little or 
no relevance, it cannot be said that the time limit "prevented] the jury from making a 
discriminating appraisal of the witness' testimony." Vest, 116 F.3d 1188-89 (internal quotes 
omitted). Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded that defendant's cross-examination 
of Deputy Orvin had passed the point of diminishing returns and his claim on appeal must 
therefore fail. See id. at 1187. 
3. The Trial Court's Refusal to Permit a Demonstration Using a 
Garbage Can Did Not Preclude Defendant from Eliciting the Desired 
Testimony. 
Defendant contends, however, that he was denied his right to confront the witness 
when the trial court did not permit Deputy Orvin to step down from the witness stand and 
demonstrate, using a garbage can admitted as a demonstrative exhibit, how the gun was 
placed on the garbage can in the building. Aplt. Brf. at 21-22. The court's refusal to permit 
the demonstration did not violate defendant's right of confrontation for two reasons. First, 
the relevancy of the gun's positioning on the garbage can is not apparent and defendant has 
failed to explain any. Second, defendant was in fact permitted to elicit the desired testimony, 
albeit not in the manner he wished. See Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 20,106 S.Ct. at 295 (holding 
that the accused is not entitled to "cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and 
to whatever extent, the defense might wish"). The court permitted Deputy Orvin to explain 
how the gun was laid down on the garbage can. See R. 931:616. And when defendant again 
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insisted that a demonstration was necessary, the court permitted Deputy Orvin to so 
demonstrate on the witness stand. R. 931: 616 ("If you want to ask the witness in what 
position the weapon was laid I'll have him demonstrate that here."). The trial judge thus 
provided defendant with more than an adequate opportunity to demonstrate how the gun was 
laid down. A demonstration on the garbage can itself would have added nothing to the 
testimony. Defendant's failure to take advantage of that opportunity, insisting instead on a 
demonstration using the garbage can, R. 931: 617, cannot be attributed to the court. 
II. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S 
CONVICTION FOR USING A CONCEALED FIREARM IN THE 
COMMISSION OF A CRIME OF VIOLENCE 
Defendant next contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict 
that defendant was guilty of carrying a concealed weapon in the commission of a crime of 
violence. Aplt. Brf. at 23-25. Defendant's claim fails for two reasons. 
First, defendant's claim fails because he assigns a greater culpable mental state for the 
offense than is required. Without citing any authority, defendant asserts that the State was 
required to prove that defendant "knowingly and intentionally" concealed the pistol. Aplt. 
Brf. at 23. However, because the concealed weapons statute does not specify a culpable 
mental state, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (Supp. 1995), the State was only required to 
prove "intent, knowledge, or recklessness." Utah Code Ann. § 67-2-102 (1995) (emphasis 
added). Defendant's claim thus fails because he challenges only the sufficiency of the 
evidence with respect to an intentional mental state. He does not challenge the sufficiency 
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of the evidence with respect to a knowing or reckless mental state, either of which are 
sufficient for a finding of criminal liability. 
Second, defendant's claim fails in any event because he ignores the evidence 
supporting a finding of intentional conduct. Although Deputy Owen testified that he did not 
believe defendant intentionally concealed the gun, he subsequently clarified that he did not 
believe defendant was intentionally concealing the weapon "as far as [he] could tell to start 
with." R. 935: 468. Moreover, Deputy Owen's belief at the time regarding defendant's 
mental state was speculative and not dispositive of the issue. Unless a defendant admits to 
his intention, criminal intent is not susceptible of direct proof and must "be inferred from the 
actions of the defendant or from surrounding circumstances." State v. Murphy, 61A P.2d 
1220, 1223 (Utah 1983); accord State v. Fixel, 945 P.2d 149, 152 n.4 (Utah App. 1997) 
(observing that because "[t]here is rarely direct evidence of something as intangible as 
'intent,'" proof thereof "is invariably a matter of inference to be drawn by the factfinder from 
all the evidence"). Thus, as against what any witness may testify, "it is the jury's privilege 
to weigh and consider all of the other facts and circumstances shown in evidence in 
determining what they will believe." State v. Peterson, 22 Utah 2d 377,378,453 P.2d 696, 
697 (Utah 1969) (referring to a defendant's testimony). 
Both deputies testified that the weapon was concealed under defendant's shirt when 
they arrived, R. 935: 281-82; R. 931: 520-21, and even defendant's own witness, Clayton 
Call, allowed that the weapon may have been partially concealed, R. 931: 726-27. Thus, 
where defendant openly admitted that he was carrying his gun in the holster, R. 931: 800, the 
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jury may reasonably infer that by wearing his shirt out, defendant intended that the gun be 
concealed. That evidence alone was sufficient to support a finding of intent. See Peterson, 
22 Utah 2d at 378,453 P.2d 697 (recognizing "the elementary rule that a person is presumed 
to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts"); accord State v. Sisneros, 631 
P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1981). 
Other evidence introduced at trial, ignored by defendant on appeal, was even more 
convincing of an intent to conceal. On direct examination by defendant, Clayton Call 
testified that defendant wore his shirts "[a]lways tucked in." R. 931: 731. Likewise, Sharon 
Felton testified that defendant normally wore his shirts tucked in and that defendant was in 
fact wearing his shirt tucked in on the day of the assault. R. 933: 1066-67. However, she 
testified that shortly before the deputies arrived, defendant pulled his shirt up and over his 
gun. R. 933: 1067-70. Where Clayton Call had just advised defendant of the deputies' 
impending arrival, see R. 933: 959-60; R. 931: 722-24, Sharon Felton's testimony that 
defendant pulled his shirt up and over the gun creates a strong inference that defendant 
intentionally concealed the weapon from the deputies. Accordingly, the evidence was not 
"completely lacking or [ ] so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly 
unreasonable and unjust" State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, f 19, 999 P.2d 565 {quoting Child v. 
Gonda, 972 P.2d 425,433 (Utah 1998)). 
Defendant also asserts for the first time on appeal that because the assault on the 
officers did not occur until after he had exposed the firearm, the evidence was insufficient 
to demonstrate that he used the concealed firearm "in the commission o f the crime. Aplt. 
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Brf. at 24-25. As defendant acknowledges, he did not raise this claim below and must 
therefore demonstrate plain error. See State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah 1989) 
(holding that appellants must show plain error on issues raised for the first time on appeal). 
In essence, defendant argues that by its plain terms the statute requires that 
concealment of the weapon be contemporaneous with the commission of the violent crime. 
Under that logic, however, a concealed weapons offense can almost never occur if the 
concealed weapon itself is used to commit the crime of violence—some other instrument 
would have to be used. Such a reading of the statute is Unreasonably confused [and] 
inoperable." State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, f 45, 989 P.2d 1091 (internal quotes 
omitted). To the contrary, a reasonable reading of the statute presumes that the concealed 
weapon is subsequently exposed to commit the crime of violence. 
In any event, where, as here, "the trial court did not have the benefit of an appellate 
decision interpreting the statute's requirement/' the error cannot be deemed obvious. 
Eldredge, 113 P.2d at 36; accord State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236,239 (Utah App. 1997) (holding 
that "a trial court's error is not plain where there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial 
court"). 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO MERGE THE 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT CONVICTIONS WITH THE CONCEALED 
WEAPON CONVICTION 
Relying on Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1995), defendant next contends that the trial 
court erred in refusing to merge the aggravated assault convictions with the concealed 
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weapon conviction. Aplt. Brf. at 25-27. Defendant argues that "he could not have 
committed the second-degree felony concealed weapon offense without necessarily having 
committed the offense of aggravated assault because the second degree felony concealed 
weapon offense... requires that the concealed weapon be used in the commission of a crime 
of violence or in this case during the course of an aggravated assault(s)." Aplt. Brf. at 26. 
Under section 76-1-402(3), a defendant "may not be convicted of both the offense 
charged and [an] included offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1995). Accordingly, 
"a lesser included offense must be merged into a greater offense if the defendant could not 
have committed the greater without having necessarily committed the lesser." State v. 
Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, f 59, — Utah Adv. Rep — (citing State v. Wood, 868 P.2d 70,89 
(Utah 1993), overruled on other grounds by State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1996), 
and State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301,1313 (Utah 1986)); accord State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 
156 (Utah 1983). 
In State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court held that in 
determining whether a greater-lesser relationship exists between offenses requiring merger, 
the court must "comparje] the statutory elements of the two crimes as a theoretical matter 
and, where necessary, by reference to the facts proved at trial." Hill, 61A P.2d at 97; accord 
Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, at f 59. 
In State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court 
added to the Hill analysis in determining whether a greater-lesser relationship existed 
between second degree felony murder and its predicate offense of aggravated assault. In that 
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case, the defendant was convicted of second degree felony murder and aggravated robbery. 
803 P.2d at 1234. Because the aggravated robbery was the predicate offense of second 
degree felony murder, defendant argued that his aggravated robbery conviction should have 
merged with his felony murder conviction. Id. 
Under the felony murder statute in effect at the time, a criminal homicide constituted 
murder in the second degree if the actor committed criminal homicide "while in the 
commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from the commission or attempted 
commission o f certain specified crimes, including aggravated robbery. See id. at 1236-37. 
Applying the Hill analysis, McCovey observed that "[u]nder a strict theoretical comparison, 
aggravated robbery . . . . does qualify [as a lesser included offense] under . . . the felony 
murder rule." Id. at 1237. And under a factual comparison, "[i]t [was] undisputed that all 
elements of aggravated robbery were proven at trial and that [the defendant] was convicted 
of the crime." Id. It was likewise undisputed "that the murder took place during the 
commission of aggravated robbery." Id. The Court thus acknowledged that "under the Hill 
analysis aggravated robbery would be a lesser included offense of felony murder." Id. 
Although aggravated robbery appeared to meet the requirements of a lesser included 
offense under the Hill analysis, the Supreme Court concluded that it was not a lesser included 
offense. In so concluding, the Court identified a third step for determining whether a greater-
lesser relationship exists requiring merger—"a determination of whether the legislature 
intended aggravated robbery to be a lesser included offense of second degree felony murder." 
Id. at 1235. The Court concluded that "the Utah State Legislature did not intend the multiple 
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crimes of felony murder to be punished as a single crime, but rather, that the homicide be 
enhanced to second degree felony murder in addition to the underlying felony. Id. at 1239 
(emphasis added). 
In determining the intent of the legislature, the Court first "recognize[d] that 
enhancement statutes are different in nature than other criminal statutes." Id. at 1237. The 
Court also observed that "[aggravated robbery does not, by its nature, have overlapping 
elements with any traditional form of murder." Id. at 1237. Finally, the Court "considered] 
the nature and purpose of the felony murder statute." Id. at 1238. The Court observed that 
one of the purposes of the statute was to dispense with the requirement of showing a culpable 
mental state where a death occurs during the commission of a felony. Id. However, the 
Court focused on another purpose of the statute—"to deter the use offeree or weapons in the 
commission of a felony." Id. The Court reasoned: 
If a felon knows that a homicide committed during the commission of a felony, 
whether accidental or unintentional, will be treated as a first degree felony in 
addition to the underlying felony being committed, he or she will be less apt 
to use deadly force or dangerous weapons. Conversely, if the legislature 
intended to make the underlying felony a lesser included offense, then a felon 
could receive a two-for-one windfall by convincing the jury that the homicide 
was unintentional or accidental. 
Id. at 1239. The Court concluded that the legislature could not have intended to create such 
a windfall. Id. 
The Court acknowledged that its decision was in apparent conflict with State v. 
Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986), which held that the aggravating offenses that enhance 
second degree murder to first degree murder are lesser included offenses of first degree 
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murder. McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1237-38. However, the Court in McCovey noted that first 
degree murder is distinguishable from second degree murder in that first degree murder is 
punishable by death or life imprisonment. Id. at 1238. As such, imposing a punishment for 
the aggravating offense would add nothing to the punishment. Id. In contrast, second degree 
felony murder carries a punishment of five years to life and the Court thus held that "it would 
not be needless or surplusage to consider the underlying felony as a separate offense." Id.1 
As a predicate to the second degree felony offense of carrying a concealed weapon, 
aggravated assault has the "same or less than all" of the elements of the concealed weapons 
crime. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-402(3)(a) (1995); McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1237. 
Moreover, and as discussed above, all the elements of aggravated assault were proven at trial 
and defendant was thus convicted of both counts. As also discussed above, defendant used 
the concealed weapon in the commission of the aggravated assaults. Thus, under the Hill 
analysis alone, aggravated assault would be a lesser included offense of the second degree 
felony crime of carrying a concealed weapon. However, as in McCovey, resolution of the 
issue is not reached simply by a comparison of the elements under the Hill analysis, but 
"requires a determination of whether the legislature intended [aggravated assault and the 
other aggravating crimes] to be [ ] lesser included offensefs] of [carrying a concealed weapon 
in the commission of a violent crime]." See McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1235. 
7The Court also noted that in McCovey the victim of the robbery was the video 
store and the victim of the murder was a customer, whereas in Shaffer the victim of the 
robbery and the victim of the murder were the same person. McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1238. 
This distinction, however, bore no relevance to the Court's overriding conclusion that the 
legislature did not intend that the predicate offenses of second degree felony murder be 
considered lesser included offenses. 
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Section 76-10-504 makes it unlawful for a person to carry a concealed firearm without 
a valid concealed firearm permit. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(l)(b) (Supp. 1995). The 
statute provides that it is a class B misdemeanor if the firearm does not contain ammunition 
and a class A misdemeanor if the firearm contains ammunition. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
504( 1 )(b) (Supp. 1995). However, the statute enhances the offense to a second degree felony 
"[i]f the concealed firearm is used in the commission of a crime of violence as defined in 
Section 76-10-501, and the person is a party to the offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(3) 
(Supp. 1995). Thus, like the second degree felony murder statute considered in McCovey, 
the second degree felony provision for carrying a concealed weapon is an enhancement 
statute, "different in nature than other criminal statutes." See McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1237. 
Moreover, just as "[aggravated robbery does not, by its nature, have overlapping elements 
with any traditional form of murder," Id. at 1237, aggravated assault does not, by its nature, 
have overlapping elements with any traditional form of carrying a concealed weapon. These 
factors suggest that the legislature did not intend that the aggravating crimes be lesser 
included offenses of the enhanced concealed weapons offense. 
Moreover, the general purpose of the concealed weapons statute "is to protect the 
public by preventing an individual from having on hand a weapon of which the public is 
unaware and which the individual might use should he be so inclined." State v. Williams, 
63 6 P.2d 1092,1094 (Utah 1981). A concealed weapon may pose varying degrees of danger 
depending on the circumstances. Undoubtedly recognizing this fact, the legislature 
designated three different levels of punishment depending on the risk posed by the 
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circumstances. For example, a concealed weapon containing ammunition represents a 
greater danger to the public than one without ammunition. Accordingly, a violation of the 
statute under the former circumstances is punishable as a class A misdemeanor rather than 
a class B misdemeanor. See Utah Code Ann. §76-10-504(1) (Supp. 1995). And because the 
danger to the public increases exponentially when a concealed weapon is actually used in a 
crime of violence, the legislature made a violation of the statute a second degree felony under 
those circumstances. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(3) (Supp. 1995). As with felony 
murder, see McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1238, the legislature did not thus envision any lesser 
punishment for the predicate offenses. It simply sought to deter the more dangerous conduct 
by imposing a more severe punishment. 
That the legislature did not intend aggravated assault to be a lesser included offense 
becomes apparent when the list of offenses that qualify as an aggravator under the statute is 
considered. Like aggravated assault, most of the predicate offenses under the statute carry 
equal or lighter punishments. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1995) (manslaughter), 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-105 (1995) (mayhem), Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301 (1995) 
(kidnapping), Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (Supp. 1995) (robbery), Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
202 (1995) (burglary), and Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1995) (extortion). However, 
murder, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1996), and rape, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402 
(1995), are both, first degree felonies, and aggravated murder, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 
(Supp. 1996), is a capital offense. If, as defendant suggests, the aggravating crimes for the 
enhanced concealed weapons offense are included offenses, then not only would the "lesser 
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included" offense of aggravated assault merge, but so would the "greater included" offenses 
of rape, murder, and aggravated murder. Surely, the legislature did not intend such a result, 
but intended to punish the underlying felony as well. 
In summary, reason dictates that the legislature did not intend the multiple crimes of 
section 76-10-504(3) to be punished as a single crime, but rather, that the concealed weapon 
offense be enhanced to a second degree felony in addition to the underlying felony. Cf. 
McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1239) (using similar language in the context of second degree felony 
murder). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to merge the aggravated assault 
convictions with the second degree felony concealed weapon conviction.8 
IV. 
DEFENDANT HAS SHOWN NEITHER PLAIN ERROR NOR 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR THE LACK OF A 
LESSER INCLUDED INSTRUCTION ON THREATENING WITH A 
DANGEROUS WEAPON 
Defendant complains, for the first time on appeal, that the jury was not given an 
instruction on threatening with a dangerous weapon, Utah Code Ann. £76-10-506 (1995), 
as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault. Aplt. Brf. at 28-29, 32-36. Because his 
attorney did not request an instruction for threatening with a dangerous weapon, and because 
the trial court did not give the instruction sua sponte, defendant rests his claim on both 
Even if this Court were to conclude that an aggravated assault conviction merges 
with a second degree felony concealed weapons conviction, only one of the two 
aggravated assault convictions would merge. See Wood, 868 P.2d at 90 (observing that 
"it makes no sense . . . to merge both convictions when the law requires only one 
predicate offense"). 
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ineffective assistance of counsel, Aplt. Brf. at 32-36, and plain error, Aplt. Brf. at 28-29. For 
the reasons explained below, defendant's claim fails. 
A. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND PLAIN ERROR ANALYSES. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, defendant must meet the two-prong test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)). Under the Strickland test, defendant "must 
meet the heavy burden of showing that (1) trial counsel rendered deficient performance 
which fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and (2) 
counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him." State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 
1998) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688,104 S.Ct. at 2064) (other citations omitted). To 
prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, "the defendant must overcome the presumption 
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial 
strategy.5" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689,104 S.Ct. at 2065 (citation omitted). A conviction 
will not be reversed for ineffective assistance unless "'there was a "lack of any conceivable 
tactical basis" for counsel's actions.'" State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 635 (Utah App. 
1997) (quoting State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting State v. 
Moritzsky, 111 P.2d 688,692 (Utah. App.1989)); accord Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 
876 (Utah 1993) (holding that it will not find ineffectiveness unless there is "no reasonable 
basis" for making the decision). 
Plain Error. "A party who fails to raise an issue with the trial court is generally 
barred from raising that issue for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed 
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plain error." Bluff, 2002 UT 66, at % 25. To establish plain error, defendant must show that 
"(i) an error was made, (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (iii) the 
error was harmful, so that in the absence of the error, a more favorable outcome was 
reasonably likely." State v. Helmick, 2000 UT 70, f 9,9 P.3d 164 (citing State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 1993)). Like an ineffectiveness claim, however, this Court will not 
save the defendant from any alleged error if defendant made a conscious decision not to seek 
the relief or otherwise led the trial court into error. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, at % 25. The 
defendant, therefore, must not only demonstrate that the error was obvious, but also that the 
decision not to seek the relief "would serve no conceivable strategic purpose." State v. 
Labrum, 925 P.2d937, 939 (Utah 1996). 
B. DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO RELIEF BASED ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL OR PLAIN ERROR BECAUSE A DECISION NOT TO REQUEST A LESSER 
INCLUDED INSTRUCTION IS A REASONABLE TACTICAL CHOICE. 
In support of his claim of both ineffective assistance and plain error, defendant relies 
on the Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551 (Utah 1984). Aplt. 
Brf. at 28-29, 32-33. However, in Oldroyd the defendant asked the trial court for an 
instruction on the lesser included offense of threatening with a dangerous weapon, but that 
request was denied. Id. at 553. Oldroyd held that the court's refusal to give the instruction 
was error under the circumstances of that case. Id. at 554-56. Oldroyd did not address a 
failure to give the instruction where none was requested as is the case here and is therefore 
inapposite. Because this Court will not reverse a conviction based on ineffective assistance 
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or plain error where there is a strategic basis for counsel's decision, whether defendant was 
entitled to such an instruction is not at issue before the Court here. 
It is in fact conceivable that the defense made a deliberate and tactical choice not to 
request the lesser included instruction. Defendant maintained throughout trial that he never 
aimed his gun at the deputies or otherwise used it in a threatening manner, but simply tried 
to remove it to comply with Deputy Owen's instructions. Thus, to acquit defendant of the 
aggravated assault charges, the jury must have believed defendant's account of the incident, 
and have completely disregarded the testimony of the deputies and Mrs. Felton. An 
instruction on the lesser included offense could have only provided the jury with another 
basis to render a guilty verdict, albeit a class A misdemeanor rather than a third degree 
felony, and would in all probability not have affected the jury's willingness to give credence 
to the deputies' testimony which established the aggravated assault. Therefore, the defense 
strategy of not requesting the jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of threatening 
with a weapon was suited to the defendant's theory of the case. It is also reasonable to 
believe that defendant would rather force the jury to choose between guilt and acquittal than 
risk giving the jury an option to "split the baby." 
Because defendant has not demonstrated that a decision not to ask for an instruction 
on the lesser included offense "would serve no conceivable strategic purpose," both his 
ineffectiveness claim and his plain error claim fail. Labrum, 925 P.2d at 939 (applying plain 
error analysis); accord Winward, 941 P.2d at 635 (applying ineffective assistance analysis). 
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The apparent decision not to request the instruction neither constituted an unprofessional 
error, nor did it effect any demonstrably prejudicial impact on the outcome of the trial.9 
V. 
COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO MOVE FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT BASED 
ON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE DID NOT CONSTITUTE INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
In his final point on appeal, defendant contends that his counsel was ineffective for 
not alleging as a basis for his motion for a directed verdict the failure of the State to introduce 
evidence that defendant did not have a concealed weapons permit. Aplt. Brf. at 31-32. As 
discussed above, to prevail on a claim of ineffectiveness, a defendant must not only show that 
trial counsel performed deficiently, but also that the deficient performance prejudiced him. 
Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50. Where, as here, "it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim 
on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,... that course should be followed." Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 697,104 S.Ct. at 2069; accord State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50,61 (Utah 1993) 
defendant also argues that the holding in State v. Hill, 688 P.2d 450 (Utah 1984) 
makes "the obviousness of the trial court's error [ ] even more apparent." Aplt. Brf. at 29, 
33. As explained above, however, whether the law entitled defendant to the lesser 
included instruction, no matter how well-settled, is not the determinative issue when there 
is a sound tactical basis for not requesting the instruction. In any event, the Supreme 
Court has observed that "[t]he distinctions in levels of proscribed conduct [between 
aggravated assault and threatening with a dangerous weapon] are clear and easily to be 
comprehended." State v. Verdin, 595 P.2d 862, 862 (Utah 1979). At the very worst, it 
would appear that contrary to defendant's claim, the more specific statute is aggravated 
assault—which requires a specific threat to do bodily injury to another with a dangerous 
weapon, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995), not threatening with a dangerous 
weapon—which generally requires the display of a weapon in an angry and threatening 
manner or in a fight, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506 (1995). 
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("reiterat[ing] that [the Court] need not address both components if a defendant fails to meet 
his or her burden on either one"). 
To meet the prejudice prong, defendant must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688,694,104 S.Ct. at 2064,2068. Defendant 
contends that because the State introduced no evidence that he did not have a concealed 
weapons permit, the trial court "would have had to dismiss Count I because no evidence had 
been introduced by the State that he lacked a valid permit." Aplt. Brf. at 35. That 
contention, however, assumes that the State would not have been allowed to reopen its case 
and introduce the necessary evidence. The assumption is not valid. 
Utah courts have long recognized that a trial court may permit the State to reopen its 
case to meet an insufficiency challenge. For example, in State v. Gregorious, 81 Utah 33, 
16 P.2d 893 (1932), the defendant was charged with having committed an infamous crime 
against nature. The State rested its case after calling as its only witness an accomplice to the 
crime. Id. at 894-95. Citing the rule that a conviction could not be sustained based on the 
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, the defendant moved for a directed verdict for 
insufficient evidence. Id. at 895. Rather than granting defendant's motion, the trial court 
granted the State's request to reopen the case so that it could call a witness who could 
provide the corroborating testimony. Id. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, 
holding that "[i]t was within the discretion of the court to permit the case to be reopened." 
Id. 
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In State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323,234 P.2d 600 (1951), the State charged defendant 
with grand larceny, but failed to put on any evidence of the value of the stolen car. Id. at 
325-26, 234 P.2d at 601. Rather than moving to reopen the case, the State asked the trial 
court to take judicial notice that the car's value exceeded the grand larceny requirements. 
Id. at 326,234 P.2d at 601. The court denied the motion for a directed verdict and instructed 
the jury that it must "'take the value of this property as being in excess of $50.00 and 
therefore the defendant, if he is guilty at all, is guilty of grand larceny.'" Id. In holding that 
the trial court erred in so instructing the jury, the Supreme Court observed that "[t]he State's 
attorney might properly and with little difficulty have moved to reopen and supply the 
missing evidence." Id. 
In State v. Seel 827 P.2d 954 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992), 
this Court also acknowledged the State's ability to reopen its case to introduce evidence 
necessary for a conviction. After the State rested, the trial court in Seel orally dismissed the 
possession of a firearm charge against the defendant because no evidence had been 
introduced that he knew the pistol was in the vehicle. Id. at 957. However, the court then 
granted the State's motion to reopen the case so that it could introduce the missing evidence. 
Id. After hearing the additional testimony, the court reinstated the firearm charge and the 
jury found defendant guilty. Id. at 957-58. On appeal, defendant argued that his right against 
double jeopardy was violated because the firearm charge had been dismissed by the trial 
court. Id. at 962. Noting that the order had not been reduced to writing, and citing 
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Gregorious, the court of appeals held that "the trial court's decision to allow the State to 
reopen the evidence was not plain error." Id.10 
Thus, even had defendant's counsel here moved for a directed verdict based on a lack 
of evidence that defendant did not have a concealed weapons permit, the State could have 
"properly and with little difficulty [ ] moved to reopen and supply the missing evidence." 
Lawrence, 120 Utah at 326, 234 P.2d at 601. As acknowledged by defendant on appeal, 
Aplt. Brf. at 31-32, he admitted on cross-examination that he did not have and never has had 
a concealed weapons permit. See R. 933: 961. That testimony was, in fact, consistent with 
defendant's position throughout the proceedings. See, e.g., R. 297 (alleging that no permit 
was required to possess a firearm on place of residence or business); R. 332 (same); R. 486 
(same); R. 513-14 (contending that it is legal to carry a concealed firearm at your residence, 
property, or business and summarizing the State's burden as threefold: (1) that the firearm 
was concealed, (2) that a crime was committed before defendant exposed the firearm, and 
(3) that the firearm was exposed "from a hiding place to a position of assault at the very 
10See also McNair v. Hayward, 666 P.2d 321, 324 (Utah 1983) (suggesting that 
prosecutor could have moved to reopen the case and recall the witnesses to clarify the 17-
day discrepancy as to when the thefts occurred). Other jurisdictions have also 
acknowledged that the State may reopen its case to meet an insufficiency challenge. See, 
e.g., Barnett v. State, 244 Ga.App. 585, 587 n.2, 536 S.E.2d 263,267 n.2 (Ga. App. 2000) 
(observing that "it is well settled that a trial court has discretion to reopen the evidence 
after the State has rested and the defendant has moved for a directed verdict"), cert, 
denied (Jan 5,2001); People v. Whipple, 734 N.Y.S.2d 549, 553 (N.Y. App. 2001) 
(holding that "where . . . the missing element is simple to prove and not seriously 
contested, and reopening the case does not unduly prejudice the defense, a court may, in 
its discretion, grant a motion to reopen"); State v. Howard, 320 N.C. 718, 724, 360 S.E.2d 
790, 794 (N.C. 1987) (holding that "[t]he trial judge has the discretionary power to permit 
the introduction of additional evidence after a party has rested its case, and can reopen a 
case for additional testimony after arguments to the jury have begun"). 
40 
moment of exposure"). Because defendant had implicitly admitted to not having the permit, 
the State reasonably assumed that the matter was not disputed. See Lawrence, 120 Utah at 
327,234 P.2d at 601 (in holding that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice regarding 
the value of the stolen car, the Court observed that it "was not a case where the defendant 
either expressly or impliedly admitted the value, nor by conduct or statements of himself or 
counsel, allowed it to be assumed that the matter was not disputed"). Had defendant 
suddenly disputed that fact by filing a motion for a directed verdict, that motion would have 
inevitably been followed by a motion to reopen the case for the admission of evidence that 
defendant did not have the required permit. Accordingly, any failure by defense counsel to 
move for a directed verdict was not prejudicial. 
In any event, this Court will "not countenance an argument that turns on a defendant 
having lost the opportunity to take a position at trial not consistent with the truth." See State 
v. Lavadour, 2001 UT App 328 n.l (memorandum decision) (reproduced in Addendum B). 
Therefore, where defendant had implicitly conceded throughout the proceedings that he did 
not have a concealed weapons permits, and chose not to dispute that fact at trial, but rather 
to admit it, he cannot complain on appeal that his counsel failed to take a position 
inconsistent with both the truth and his strategic decision not to dispute the fact. See also 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689,104 S.Ct. at 2065 (holding that "defendant must overcome the 
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presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound 
trial strategy.'") (citations omitted).11 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted this |c? day of August, 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
iY S. GRAY 
DISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Attorneys for Appellee 
1
'Moreover, it is far from clear that the State is required to produce evidence that a 
defendant does not have a concealed weapons permit where the defendant never claims to 
have a permit. See, e.g., State v. Bowdry, 337 N.W.2d 216,218-19 (Iowa 1983) 
(concluding that "where no demand for a permit is made at the scene and no permit is 
produced there or at trial, the issue of a permit is not in the case unless substantial 
evidence appears in the record from some quarter—that the person had a valid permit at 
the time"). Indeed, the permit issue is more appropriately treated as an affirmative 
defense requiring the defendant to first raise the issue. 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const amend, VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (3) (1995) 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required 
to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of 
preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (Supp. 1995) 
(1) Except as provided in Section 76-10-503 and in Subsections (2) and 
(3): 
(a) a person who carries a concealed dangerous weapon which is not a 
firearm on his person or one that is readily accessible for immediate use which 
is not securely encased, as defined in this part, in a place other than his 
residence, property, or business under his control is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(b) a person without a valid concealed firearm permit who carries a 
concealed dangerous weapon which is a firearm and that contains no 
ammunition is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, but if the firearm contains 
ammunition the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
( 2 ) . . . ; 
(3) If the concealed firearm is used in the commission of a violent felony 
as defined in Section 76-10-501, and the person is a party to the offense, the 
person is guilty of a second degree felony. 
( 4 ) . . . . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann, S 76-10-506 (1995^ 
Every person, except those persons described in Section 76-10-503, who, 
not in necessary self defense in the presence of two or more persons, draws or 
exhibits any dangerous weapon in an angry and threatening manner or 
unlawfully uses the same in any fight or quarrel is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
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ORME, Judge: 
Even if we were to hold that appellant's confession was the 
product of police coercion, we would be unable to escape the 
conclusion that, due to the strength of other evidence 
identifying appellant as the robber, the trial court's admission 
of the confession into evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt- See Arizona v. Fulminante. 499 U.S. 279, 306-312, 111 S. 
Ct. 1246, 1263-66 (1991). 
It was particularly damaging that appellant's two 
accomplices identified him as one of the two individuals who 
entered the store and as the one who played the lead role in 
committing the robbery. Benally's trial testimony was cogent and 
credible. The fact that Benally and appellant are first cousins 
dispels any possibility that Benally did not really know 
appellant and, in the absence of any indication the relationship 
between the two was strained, substantially undercuts any 
suggestion that Benally framed an innocent third-party. 
In addition, appellant's trial counsel conceded that 
appellant was in the store attempting to steal beer on the 
evening in question. In presenting his client's version of the 
events at trial, defense counsel explained: "All Mr. Lavadour 
wanted was beer. He grabbed it. They ran out. Some clerk 
stepped in the way. He pulled out a cigarette lighter." When 
these comments are viewed in combination with the testimony of 
the two store clerks and the testimony of Benally, it becomes 
clear there was ample evidence to sustain appellant's conviction, 
completely independent of his confession.1 
Affirmed. 
Gregory-It. Orme, Judge 
s 
WE CONCUR: 
I * sMt * 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Wi 1 11 am A. Thome, Jr. r Judge 
1. Insofar as appellant suggests that but for his confession, 
events would have taken a completely different course, we note 
that Benally's and Gonzales's identification of him predated the 
confession and thus were not in any way tainted by it. If 
appellant is suggesting that had the confession been suppressed, 
he would have taken a different tack at trial rather than admit 
he was at the store trying to steal beer, his argument is highly 
speculative, especially given Benally's testimony. Moreover, we 
are unwilling to countenance an argument that turns on a 
defendant having lost the opportunity to take a position at trial 
not consistent with the truth. 
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